From Africa with a Russian Agenda: Facebook Pages Attacking French Elections
Investigating the Spread of Disinformation Targeting French Voters by African-based Facebook Pages Attacking Macron and Ukraine
Author:
Saman Nazaari, Alliance4Europe.
This report builds on the previous work of:
Kristina Gildejeva, Independent.
Rikard Friberg von Sydow, Södertörn University.
Saman Nazari, Alliance4Europe.
Note: this flash report contains unarchived links. We have found no reliable way to achieve Facebook links. After Meta was contacted for comment the day before publication, most of the pages were taken down.
Update:
Meta seems to have taken down 19 pages following this report and the article in Politico that covered it. The network seemingly launched over 500 ads, reaching 8 million users.
Introduction:
Since August 2023, 128 ads were posted on Facebook by 6 Facebook, pages run by West African accounts and 2 accounts of unknown origin, targeting French voters. A large portion of the ads were unlabelled political ads while other ads promoted the pages themselves. These ads and posts made by the pages tried to discredit Macron’s government, undermine support for Ukraine or attract followers to the pages. The ads reached at least 1,9 million users in France. We have previously written about three of these pages individually (1, 2, 3). We have found five more. This report aims to connect the dots and aimed to highlight the need for further investigations into what seems to be an influence operation network aiming to sow division in French society.
The countries out of which these social media pages operate happen to be countries where the Private Military Company Wagner, now the Africa Corps, has been reported to be operating. The pages are also promoting narratives aligning with Russia’s interests in Africa, including making a “fact-check” dismissing ties between the Alliance of Sahel States and Wagner. Whether there is a direct link or this is a matter of coincidence would be open for further investigation."
The pages, operated from at least three different African countries, used Canadian or US Dollars to purchase the ads and targeted specific audiences with tailored messages.
Four of these pages targeted French far-right voters while the two others respectively targeted French Muslims and the African diaspora. Two other pages target French-speaking African audiences. The pages spread messages potentially trying to undermine Macron’s government and support for Ukraine, in a possible attempt to create division among France's population. Notably, through the ads and their regular posts the different pages supported opposing political factions, throwing fuel on the fire.
This comparative report will show the similar behaviours of these pages, suggesting that they were likely part of a larger African network targeting France.
The pages’ use of unlabelled political ads violates Meta’s ad policy, yet they remained active during the EU elections and the first round of the French snap elections.
ABC News also reported on a similar network of pages operated from Africa that targeted the UK elections.
Ahead of this publication, we were made aware by other researchers that at least 9 other pages were seemingly part of the same network. We have chosen to publish these findings ahead of the second round of the French elections. We will update this article when these 9 other pages are made public by the researchers who alerted us.
Reportedly, following inquiries from Politico journalist Mark Scott to Meta on the subject, most pages that had been identified were taken down - as far as we can ascertain, this includes 14 pages.
Page Characteristics
In total, we identified 8 pages and one user that could belong to the network. Six of these targeted France.
Four of the pages named “Patriotes de France”, “Génération des patriotes”, “La Droite arrive”, and “Rendre sa grandeur à la France” were targeting French right-wing voters. The two other pages were named “Musulmans de France”, which targeted French Muslims and “Diasporas africaines en France”, which targeted the French African diaspora.
The two African pages are called “Mon Afrique” and “Actualités et Infos en Afrique”.
There is also a user called Mon Afrique created during the same period, but that did not see any use. These still remain online.
These pages were created during the same periods:
“Actualités et Infos en Afrique” - created as “Les actus régionales en France” on January 21, 2022 (4) - reactivated on 12 July, 2023 (5) - admin location unknown. — Active.
“Patriotes de France” - originally created as “Infos à la française” on August 9, 2023 (6) - admins from Benin - taken down on 03/07/2024 by Meta.
“Mon Afrique user” - created August 31, 2023 (7) - admin location unknown. - Inactive.
“Mon Afrique page” - created October 11, 2023 (8) - admins from Burkina Faso - active.
“Génération des patriotes” - created as “Info.France” on October 12, 2023 (9) - admins from Burkina Faso - taken down 03/07/2024 by Meta.
“Musulmans de France” - created April 16, 2024 (10) - admins from Mali - taken down 03/07/2024 by Meta.
“Diasporas africaines en France” - created April 16, 2024 (11) - admins from Mali. - taken down 03/07/2024 by Meta.
“Rendre sa grandeur à la France” - created June 12, 2024 (12) - admin location unknown - taken down 03/07/2024 by Meta.
“La Droite arrive” - created June 12, 2024 (13) - admin location unknown - taken down 03/07/2024 by Meta.
Most of the pages were created around the same time, suggesting they might be part of the same campaign. Notably, two of the pages were created on the same day Macron announced the snap elections (14)
The administrators of the pages are all from Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali - neighbouring countries in West Africa.
Image 1: Google Maps showing the vicinity of the countries of origin of the admin accounts of the Facebook pages.
The Senegalese publication Sengo (15) highlights that the social media company Agence de SMM et de développement en Afrique used to run “Patriot” pages similar to the ones described in this report. Only back then, they were supporting President Macron during the 2022 elections. The same article writes that the company likely has teams in Mali, Benin, and Senegal. The publication claims that previous pages had names like “100% de la france”, “les patriotes de la france”, “protection de la Nature en France”, “La France de demain”, which bears a remarkable resemblance to “Génération des patriotes”, and “Patriotes de France”.
The Sengo publication is a continuation of investigations made by the Burkina Faso publications Netafrique (16) and Burkina24 (17). While we cannot be beyond any doubt certain about the legitimacy of these page's claims, we have managed to independently verify some of their claims despite the articles being from 2022, including the existence and behaviour of the pages “protection de la Nature en France”, “Les actus de France”, Tous pour la France saine, Les actus régionales en France, La France verte and a job ad for the company.
These pages may be run by different teams of the same organization and could be part of a larger network. While we can't confirm they are related, the pattern is intriguing and worth further investigation.
Later on in this report, we will delve further into the potential connection between these pages and the Wagner group.
Ads
The pages published ads that reached around 1.9 million people in France. After Facebook took down these pages, it also now seems like the pages also ran ads targeting African countries. We have not investigated the ads targeting Africa.
The pages all published ads that obfuscate their content through various techniques to evade Meta’s automated content moderation.
The first method we observed was the crossing out of parts of words, obfuscating keywords that could be detected.
Images 2: Examples of obfuscation by crossing out of parts of words.
The second technique entails using dashes and asterisks to avoid detection.
Image 3: three images from “Muslimans de France”, “Generation de patriotes”, and “Diasporas africaines en France” obfuscating their ads by using dashes and asterisks.
The pages primarily ran two types of ads:
Ads used to promote the page itself;
Ads used to promote operational content.
The first category usually promotes the page as a news or information provider, trying to attract new followers who will later be exposed to the page's operational content organically. These ads use the banner photo of the pages to promote them.
Images 4: Four ads promoting the pages starting on the same two days.
The second type entails the promotion of narratives attacking Ukraine and/or Macron’s government. For example, the first post below claims that Macron intends to send troops to Ukraine by recruiting homeless African and Arab men. The second writes that Zelenskyy is against cease-fire and peace negotiations and that he is recruiting new “fresh meat” in France, with Macron’s support. The last one draws a parallel between Macron and Zelenskyy and warns against the destruction of France. Similar ads can also be found on “Diasporas africaines en France”.
Image 5: Examples of ads discrediting both Ukraine and Macron.
We also see that some of the ads were engaging in other divisive topics, such as the Israel-Hamas war, New Caledonia, and discrimination against Muslims.
Image 6: Examples of ads on the Israel-Hamas war, New Caledonia, and discrimination against Muslims
Ads published on the same day by “Diasporas Africanes de France” and “Muslimans de France” almost have identical narratives.
Images 7: Two ads posted on the same day by pages created on the same date have identical narratives.
Two of the pages also published ads alleging that an article from Asia Times claims France has sent their troops to Ukraine. The first ad, from “Muslimans de France”, claims France sent the French Foreign Legion first and that they will then send Maghreb immigrants. The second ad, from “Diasporas africaines en France”, claims France's military detachment to Ukraine also includes African immigrants and that Maghreb immigrants will be next.
Image 8: Example of ads referencing the Asia Times article.
Another ad from “Diasporas africaines en France” makes the same claim but also adds that 150 French troops have died in Africa.
Image 9: Claim that French troops have died in Ukraine.
The ads were political and were taking active measures to avoid automated content moderation. Meta failed to label a large majority of them. More examples can be found in the original three reports above.
Ads Narratives:
The narratives displayed on the ads by these channels were rather similar. Evidence of this can be found in the previous reports.
The two “Patriot” pages share a common narrative: Macron is prioritising support for Ukraine over the well-being of France.
One of the”Patriot” pages, the Muslim page, and the African diaspora page were also spreading narratives about France sending French Arabic, Africans and Muslims to fight in Ukraine.
Three of the pages also use the unrest in New Caledonia to discredit Macron.
Posts
The ads from these pages tell one story: against Macron and Ukraine. However, their regular posts cover a range of topics. While they consistently discredit Macron, they also promote and demote various other subjects. Below, we highlight the overlapping themes, though these aren't the only topics the pages address.
The different pages seem to support different political movements and parties.
Patriotes de France is heavily promoting the National Rally (Rassemblement National - RN), including using their campaign material (e.g. 18, 19, 20, 21).
Images 10: Patriotes de France posts promoting RN and discrediting Macron.
The page Rendre sa grandeur à la France is also promoting the RN and discrediting Macron (E.g. 22, 23, 24, 25).
Image 11: Posts from “Rendre sa grandeur à la France” promoting the RN and attacking Macron.
The page “La Droite arrive” is doing the same, even at times using identical posts (E.g. 26, 27, 28, 29).
Image 12: Posts from “La Droite arrive” promoting the RN and attacking Macron. The first post was identical to the one published by “Rendre sa grandeur à la France”.
The page “Generation de patriotes” also supports the National Rally (e.g. 30, 31, 32, 33) but also touches on other debates found in the far-right (e.g. 34, 35, 36).
Image 13: Post quoting Marine Le Pen and another discrediting trans athletes.
Both pages and “La Droite arrive” also discredit the left coalition the Popular Front (e.g. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42).
Image 14: posts discrediting the Popular Front, one of which originates from the RN.
“Musulmans de France” and “Diasporas africaines en France” were discrediting both the National Rally and Macron (e.g. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46).
Image 15: posts discrediting National Rally and Macron
Musulmans de France also published a post promoting the Popular Front’s creation (47):
Image 16: Post by Musulmans de France promoting the creation of the Popular Front.
The page “Diasporas africaines en France” promotes the political party La France Insoumise (e.g. 48, 49,
50, 51).
Image 17: “Diasporas africaines en France” promotes La France Insoumise.
The pages “Musulmans de France”, “Generation de patriotes”, and “Diasporas africaines en France” also share content attacking the actions of Israel during the Israel-Hamas war and in support of Gaza (e.g. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59).
Image 18: Posts condemning Israel's actions and showing support for Gaza.
The “La Droite arrive”, "Rendre sa grandeur à la France", and “Patriotes de France” pages also shared content originating from the National Rally to promote them while the“Generation de patriotes” page mostly created original content to do so.
Both Diasporas africaines en France and Musulmans de France also post content reflecting their name (60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65), seemingly trying to attract their target audience.
Images 19: Posts catering to Muslims, and the African diaspora, in France (Posts translated from French).
Four of the pages also use #Manu1er, a hashtag referencing President Emmanuel Macron, using a one (1) instead of an L (66, 67, 68, 69).
Images 20: Use of the hashtag #Manu1er.
Lastly, one of the Diasporas africaines en France posts also called on Africans to prepare themselves to defend their countries from European invasions (70).
Image 21: Post by Diasporas africaines en France - translated from French.
African side of the potential network
Generation of Patriots is liked by a page called Mon Afrique. Mon Afrique is also designated as the beneficiary and payer of five Generation of Patriots ads. Starting from the 21st of June, Mon Afrique started running political, non-labelled ads targeting non-European audiences (the Meta ad library is not providing us with more detailed information).
The page Mon Afrique ran one ad attacking Western governments and defending the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) (71) which has military ties with the Wagner Group (72). The post presents itself as a fact-checking/disinformation-countering attempt. It denounces criticisms of the AES, in particular in regards to his ties to Wagner, as a coordinated ["a centralised and well-funded team"] attempt to spread "Western propaganda" via "fake accounts targeting the AES countries". The post states the mission of the alleged hostile information operation: "diffusing fake information and creating social tensions".
Image 22: Mon Afrique spreading Russia-aligned messages
For context, the AES is a mutual defense pact created between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso on 16 September during the 2023 Nigerien crisis. The Russian government - including through Wagner's military involvement - is presumed to have brokered this agreement and strengthened its ties with the region as a consequence(73, 74). Russia has fuelled anti-French sentiment in the region through disinformation (75). Russia has been mentioned as having a strategic interest in supporting such attempts in the context of France's intervention in the Nigerian crisis (76).
The influence of this geopolitical context, and the presence of Wagner in the region, is even more evident in the drastic shift of the second page’s narratives, which went from supporting Macron, to aligning itself with Russia.
The last remaining active page, previously reported by the Senegalese publication Sengo and the Burkina Faso publication Burkina 24 for displaying the same behaviour as those run by the social media company Agence de SMM et de Développement en Afrique, was renamed from Les Actus Régionales en France (Regional News in France) to Actualités et Infos en Afrique (News and Info in Africa) on February 13, 2024 (77).
In 2022, the page was promoting the policies of Macron and his party (e.g. 78, 79, 80, 81, 82), including promoting their reception of Ukrainian refugees (83, 84). In June of the same year, the page stopped posting before resuming again on July 12, 2023 (85).
Image 23: Actualités et Infos en Afrique promoting Macron and his party's policies.
In 2022, the page also ran an ad, discrediting Éric Zemmour, the head of the far-right party Reconquête.
Image 24: Ad from 2022 discrediting Zemmour.
When the page started posting again, the page changed its approach. The first post they made was on the topic of the pension reform protests (86).
Image 25: First post made by the page after its re-activation in 2024.
Between July 2023 and February 2024, the page started attacking Macron and his government (e.g. 87, 88, 89, 90, 91), notably concerning civil unrest, such as the farmer’s protest, and financial policy (e.g. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100).
Image 26: Post discrediting Minister of the Interior of France in relation to the farmers’ protests.
In February, the page was re-branded and started focusing on promoting Russia-aligned governments in the Sahel region, Central Africa, and the AES (e.g. 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106), which are currently supported by the Wagner group.
Image 27: examples of posts promoting the activities of Russian-aligned governments.
During the same period, the pages were also discrediting Western governments and institutions and their activities in the regions (e.g. 107, 108, 109, 110, 111).
Image 28: Posts discrediting the West.
On February 28, 2024, the pages also started reporting on Russian activities in these regions (e.g. 112, 113, 114, 115, 116), painting them in a positive light.
Image 29: First post mentioning Russia and another post promoting Russia.
After the page’s re-branding, it also started running ads. These ads revolved around the narrative of the West, and especially the US and France, conducting foreign interference in African countries.
The first ad accused Chad Prime Minister Masra of flying to the United States and France to seek “permission” before running for office as President in the Tchad elections (117).
Image 30: Image of the first 2024 ad.
One of the other ads claimed that the UN Blue Helmets have helped militants in the Central African Republic against the government (118). A second ad also supported the narrative of the United States “spreading their influence through NGOs covertly linked to the government” (119).
Images 31: ads accusing the West of foreign interference
Similar to many of the other pages, the page “Actualités et Infos en Afrique” also started running an ad promoting the page itself, exactly in the same way as those two other pages did.
Image 32: Ad promoting the page.
Mon Afrique and Actualités et Infos en Afrique use the same obfuscation techniques employed by Génération des patriotes, Patriotes de France, and Musulmans de France to avoid Meta’s automated content moderation.
While we cannot with certainty say who is behind these pages, they were furthering the interests of the Russian states and Wagner in countries we know Wagner is operating.
Impact
Based on our previous investigations, the six-page pages have managed to reach around 1,9 million users through Facebook, Instagram and Meta Audience Network ads since August 2023. We have not analysed the two African pages, as we were trying to assess the European reach of these pages.
The page with the highest organic reach was Patriotes de France, which regularly got hundreds of likes on its posts. The other five pages rarely receive more than 30 likes on their posts.
Behaviours - DISARM Red Framework
The DISARM Red Framework gives us a common language to explain disinformation tactics and techniques, behaviours and methods, used to manipulate the information space.
If these pages were part of the same network, the network was likely trying to Polarise France.
They all display similar behaviours:
Conceal network identity - the pages hide their true identity and affiliations, not revealing what organisation they belong to.
Create Personas - The pages identify as groups of French patriots or Muslims while seemingly operating from Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
Deliver Ads - Using unlabelled political ads to reach their target audience without revealing the ads' funding source.
Manipulate Platform Algorithm - Ads launched by the pages were edited to make the text harder to read, most likely to avoid detection by Meta's algorithms.
Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups - The creation of pages posing as French patriotists and Muslims while being based in Africa.
Recruit Contractors - It seems like a threat actor behind these pages hired contractors from different countries to run the pages.
Mitigation efforts and recommendations
Throughout our investigations, we flagged the three pages we previously wrote about to Meta via Facebook's regular reporting tools.
We believe that it is still important to continue this investigation and map any other pages that could be out there belonging to the same network. Considering that a similar network was found in the UK, other iterations of this network could exist in other European countries.
While writing this report, we reflected that a likely countermeasure would be to report on this story to a wider audience, informing them that the content is likely originating from a foreign actor. It seems like the story spurred Meta to act against the pages.
We ask Meta to expand the same transparency measures they have in Europe to ads targeting the rest of the world. Having better transparency on ads would simplify our investigations. We also call upon them to preserve more details in the Meta ad library, even after a page is taken down. Including the locations of the administrators of the pages, the creation date, and the time Meta took down the pages.
We also ask Meta to take measures to allow Archiving solutions such as Ghost Archive, the Wayback Maschine, and Archive.ph to work on their platforms.
Conclusions
There were similarities in the behaviour and narratives of the 6 pages targeting France that we analysed. While most of the pages were old and had tried to exploit previous important events, such as the EU elections, two pages were seemingly created to target the French snap elections.
There were similarities and connections between six of the pages targeting Europe with two other pages targeting Africa. The pages targeting Africa display very similar patterns of behaviour as the ones targeting Europe and seem to promote the interests of Russia in Africa. Especially one of the pages, Actualités et Infos en Afrique is showing signs of having ties to the Wagner group, including the page’s shifted focus from promoting Macron, to attacking him, and posts attacking and promoting Wagner's enemies and alias. Mon Afrique “fact-checking” of the claim that Wagner is tied to AES is another indicator that strengthens the hypothesis of the network's ties to the Wagner group. Further investigations are needed to better understand if these suspicions are correct.
It seems like the pages created on the same day also share some of the content they were publishing. Examples include referencing the same article in an ad or using the same videos in a post. This could indicate that different teams or individuals administered different pages.
The pages could have been part of a coordinated attempt to polarise France. Yet, more investigation is needed to fully confirm the existence of such a network and the affiliation of these pages. Whether these pages are part of a network or not, having Facebook pages administered from African countries posing as French running unlabelled political ads was problematic and should have been addressed sooner.
Questions are also raised about why a page seemingly run from Africa previously promoted Macron’s party while now attacking them.
We hope researchers across the community of democracy defenders can contribute to further investigations into this potential network, also looking at its possible existence in other countries.